Transparency Report Reporting Period: January 1, 2020 to June 30, 2020
Government Demands for User Data
In the Reporting Period, Mozilla received the following.
Legal Processes | Received | Data Produced |
---|---|---|
Search Warrants | 1 | 1 |
Subpoenas | 4 | 2 |
Court Orders | 2 | 1 |
Wiretap Orders | 0 | 0 |
Pen Register Orders | 0 | 0 |
Emergency Requests | 0 | 0 |
National Security Requests 1 | 0-249 | 0-249 |
Government Demands for Content Removal
In the Reporting Period, Mozilla received 2 government requests for content removal from our services.
Requesting Country | Requests Received | Data Produced |
---|---|---|
USA | 2 | 2 |
Copyright and Trademark Requests
Copyright
In the Reporting Period, we received 23 Copyright Takedown Notices and 0 Counter Notices.
Mozilla Service | Takedown Notices | Counter Notices |
---|---|---|
Firefox Add-ons | 16 | 0 |
0 | 0 | |
Other Services | 7 | 0 |
Trademark
In the Reporting Period, we received 8 Trademark Takedown Notices and 0 Counter Notices.
Mozilla Service | Takedown Notices | Counter Notices |
---|---|---|
Firefox Add-ons | 8 | 0 |
0 | 0 | |
Other Services | 0 | 0 |
Personal Data Requests
* In the Reporting Period, we received 1,653 requests.
Service | Received |
---|---|
Mozilla | 601 |
1,052 |
* This data was corrected on 17 February 2021.
Supplement
Legislative Reform
During this reporting period, Mozilla kept up the fight for strong privacy and data protection across the globe. After the government of India rolled out a mandatory contact tracing app, we joined civil society allies in calling for data protection and oversight resulting in removal of the requirement for Indians to install the app and a commitment to open sourcing it as well. We also filed comments with India’s Parliamentary Joint Committee on The Personal Data Protection Bill warning of the legislation’s glaring loophole for unchecked government surveillance. In hopes of mitigating the inherent privacy risks of using biometric data, we also responded to the EU’s public consultation on AI and continue to engage with the European Commission on the upcoming Digital Services Act. In a major win, the Supreme Court of Kenya struck down the country’s mandatory biometric identity system, in a case which we filed an affidavit in. As many countries look to biometric-based digital ID platforms, we offered recommendations and guardrails in advancing the concept of openness for national biometric ID systems through our open ID white paper.
To protect Americans’ metadata, we called for elimination of the Call Detail Record program in the reauthorization of USA FREEDOM Act along with greater transparency and better access to government-held information for amici curiae in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC). Furthermore, we continued our opposition to Australia’s exceptional access law – the Telecommunications and Other Legislation Amendment – aided by Mozilla Distinguished Engineer Martin Thomson who testified at a hearing held by Australia’s Independent National Security Legislation Monitor. In Mexico, we filed comments to the telecom regulator on their draft net neutrality guidelines which displayed loopholes allowing zero-rating, government shutdowns, and failed to adequately protect privacy. We also joined with the Center for Democracy & Technology to file comments recommending that U.S. officials oppose the creation of a “New IP” internet architecture more suitable for centralized control and less privacy-respecting than the internet offers today. In India, we advocated for the assurance of respect of privacy as a fundamental right in our submission to the government on their National Open Digital Ecosystems (NODE) strategy.
We highlighted serious concerns with the Indian government’s proposed intermediary liability rules, joining with Cloudflare and Github to pen an open letter, prompting the government to delay these rules and claim the final regulations will apply the toughest obligations only to the largest social media platforms. We expressed concern around threats to free speech and the undermining of strong encryption in our statement on the EARN IT Act in the US, and provided guidance to the EU on how to avoid flawed one-size-fits-all or otherwise misguided regulations through a new EU Digital Strategy – which will outline the next five years of EU tech policy. We remain concerned by the spread of traceability around the world, and put forth an analysis of Brazil’s fake news bill which has since passed the Senate but still includes dangerous data retention and surveillance provisions as it heads to the Chamber of Deputies.
Voluntary Threat Indicators & Data Disclosures
Type of Disclosure | Number of Disclosures |
---|---|
Cybersecurity Threat Indicator | 0 |
Other Specific User Data Disclosure | 0 |